

EPA REGULATORY DEFINITIONS

40 CFR 230.3

Code of Federal Regulations

Title 40. Protection of Environment

Chapter I. Environmental Protection

Agency

Subchapter H. Ocean Dumping

☞ Part 230. Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines for Specification or
Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill
Material

☞ Subpart A. General

→ § 230.3 Definitions.

For purposes of this part, the following terms shall have the meanings indicated:

(a) The term Act means the Clean Water Act (also known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or FWPCA) Pub.L. 92-500, as amended by Pub.L. 95-217, 33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq.

(b) The term adjacent means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like are “adjacent wetlands.”

(r) The term territorial sea means the belt of the sea measured from the baseline as determined in accordance with the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and extending seaward at a distance of three miles.

(s) The term waters of the United States means:

(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;

(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;

(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:

(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; or

(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;

(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under this definition;

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (s)(1) through (4) of this section;

(6) The territorial sea;

(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (s)(1) through (6) of this section; waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet the criteria of this definition) are not waters of the United States.

Waters of the United States do not include prior converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an area's status as prior converted cropland by any other federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.

(t) The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.

[58 FR 45037, Aug. 25, 1993]

SOURCE: 45 FR 85344, Dec. 24, 1980, unless otherwise noted.

AUTHORITY: Secs. 404(b) and 501(a) of the Clean Water Act of 1977, (33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) and § 1361(a)).

40 C. F. R. § 230.3, 40 CFR § 230.3

Current through June 3, 2010; 75 FR 31661

"Civiletti Memorandum"
43 Op. Att'y. Gen. 197 (1979)

**ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUE
§ 404 OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT**

The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency rather than the Secretary of the Army has ultimate administrative authority to construe the jurisdictional term "navigable waters" under § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.

Similarly, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency rather than the Secretary of the Army has ultimate administrative authority to construe § 404(f) of that Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f).

SEPTEMBER 5, 1979.

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am responding to your letter of March 29, 1979, requesting my opinion on two questions arising under § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. You asked whether the Act gives the ultimate administrative authority to determine the reach of the term "navigable waters" for purposes of § 404 to you, acting through the Chief of Engineers, or to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and similarly you ask whether the Act gives the ultimate administrative authority to determine the meaning of § 404(f) to you or to the Administrator. Although no specific provision in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or specific statement in its legislative history speaks directly to your questions, I am convinced after careful consideration of the Act as a whole that the Congress intended to confer upon the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency the final administrative authority to make those determinations. Before turning to the specific reasons for my conclusions, I believe that some background description is in order.

The basic objective of the Act is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). As one means of achieving that objective, the Act makes the discharge of any pollutant unlawful except in accordance with standards promulgated or permits issued under the act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Permits for the discharge of pollutants may be ob-

tained under §§ 402 and 404 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344, if certain requirements are met. The administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers, share responsibility for issuance of those permits and enforcement of their terms. The Administrator issues permits for point source discharges under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program established by § 402; the Secretary of the Army issues permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material under § 404.¹

During consideration of the legislative proposals that resulted in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the question whether the Secretary should play any role, through the Chief of Engineers, in issuing permits was hotly debated. The bill introduced in the Senate, S. 2770, gave the Administrator the authority to issue permits and treated discharges of dredged or fill material no differently from discharges of any other pollutant. During consideration of the bill both by the Senate Public Works Committee² and on the Senate floor,³ amendments were proposed to give the authority to issue permits for discharges of dredged or fill material to the Secretary of the Army. These amendments were offered in recognition of the Secretary's traditional responsibility under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 *et seq.*, to protect navigation, including the responsibility to regulate discharges into the navigable waters of the United States. Concerned that the Secretary would have insufficient expertise to evaluate the environmental impact of a proposed dredge

¹ A point source is defined in the Act as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft. . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).

Dredged and fill material are not defined in the Act, but are defined in regulations promulgated by the Corps of Engineers: Dredged material is "material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the United States," while fill material is "any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a water body." 33 CFR § 323.2 (k),(m).

² Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., *A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972* (1973), at 1509 (hereafter "Legislative History").

³ *Id.* at 1386.

or fill operation, Senator Muskie, the author of S.2770, opposed those amendments.⁴ He proposed instead that the Secretary certify the need for any permit for discharge of dredged material to the Administrator, who would retain permit issuing authority. The Senate adopted Senator Muskie's proposal.⁵

The House of Representatives bill, H.R. 11896, on the other hand, gave the Secretary complete responsibility over issuing permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material. Although the House bill required the Secretary to consult with the EPA on the environmental aspects of permit applications, the Secretary had the authority to make the final decision on permit issuance.⁶

The Conference Committee substitute, passed by the Congress as § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, represented a compromise between the Senate and House positions. It established a separate permit procedure for discharges of dredged or fill material to be administered by the Secretary, acting through the Chief of Engineers. The Administrator, however, retained substantial responsibility over administration and enforcement of § 404. The EPA responsibilities were perhaps best summarized by Senator Muskie during the Senate's consideration of the Conference Report:

First, the Administrator has both responsibility and authority for failure to obtain a Section 404 permit or comply with the condition thereon. Section 309 authority is available because discharge of the "pollutant" dredge spoil without a permit or in violation of a permit would violate Section 301(a).

Second, the Environmental Protection Agency must determine whether or not a site to be used for the disposal of dredged spoil is acceptable when judged against the criteria established for fresh and ocean waters similar to that which is required under Section 403.

⁴ *Id.* at 1387-88.

⁵ *Id.* at 1393.

⁶ *Id.* at 816.

Third, prior to the issuance of any permit to dispose of spoil, the Administrator must determine that the material to be disposed of will not adversely affect municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife or recreational areas in the specified site. Should the Administrator so determine, no permit may issue.⁷

Subsequent amendment of § 404 by the Clean Water Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1566, altered the relationship between the Secretary and the Administrator in only limited fashion. The amendments gave the Administrator authority comparable to the authority conferred on him by the § 402 NPDES program to approve and to monitor State programs for the discharge of dredged or fill material. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)-(l). New subsection (s) gave the Secretary of the Army explicit authority under the Act to take action to enforce those § 404 permits which he had issued. New subsection (n) cautioned that the amendments should not be considered to detract from the Administrator's enforcement authority under § 309 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.⁸

With that background, I turn to your specific questions. First, you asked whether the Secretary or the Administrator has the authority under § 404 to resolve administrative disputes over interpretation of the jurisdictional term "navigable waters." That question is an important one, since the authority to construe that term amounts to the authority to determine the scope of the § 404 permit program.

The term "navigable waters," moreover, is a linchpin of the Act in other respects. It is critical not only to the coverage of § 404, but also to the coverage of the other pollution control mechanisms established under the Act, including the § 402

⁷ *Id.* at 177. This statement, which is often quoted in explanation of the relative responsibilities of the Corps and EPA under § 404, is included in the Congressional Record as a supplement to Senator Muskie's oral remarks.

⁸ Section 309 empowers the Administrator to order compliance with the conditions or limitations of permits issued under § 402 and State permits issued under § 404, and to seek civil and criminal penalties with respect to such permits. Importantly, as the above-quoted history of § 404 indicates, the section also gives the Administrator the authority to bring enforcement actions to stop discharges without a required permit, since such discharges violate the basic prohibition set out in § 301 of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1319.

permit program for point source discharges,⁹ the regulation of discharges of oil and hazardous substances in § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, and the regulation of discharges of vessel sewage in § 312, 33 U.S.C. § 1322. Its definition is not specific to § 404, but is included among the Act's general provisions.¹⁰ It is, therefore, logical to conclude that Congress intended that there be only a single judgment as to whether—and to what extent—any particular water body comes within the jurisdictional reach of the Federal Government's pollution control authority. We find no support either in the statute or its legislative history for a conclusion that a water body would have one set of boundaries for purposes of dredged and fill permits under § 404 and a different set for purposes of the other pollution control measures in the Act. On this point I believe there can be no serious disagreement. Rather, understanding that "navigable waters" can have only one interpretation under the Act, the question is whether Congress intended ultimately for the Administrator or the Secretary to describe its parameters.

The question is explicitly resolved neither in § 404 itself nor in its legislative history. My conclusion that the Act leaves this authority in the hands of the Administrator thus necessarily draws upon the structure of the Act as a whole. First, it is the Administrator who has the overall responsibility for administering the Act's provisions, except as otherwise expressly provided. § 101(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). It is the Administrator as well who interprets the term "navigable waters" in carrying out pollution control responsibilities under sections of the Act apart from § 404.

Additionally, while the Act charges the Secretary with the duty of issuing and assuring compliance with the terms of § 404 permits, it does not expressly charge him with responsibility for deciding when a discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters takes place so that the § 404 permit requirement is brought into play. Enforcement au-

⁹ The Act, as stated above, contains a general prohibition against the "discharge of any pollutant" except in compliance with particular standards and permit procedures. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The definition of the phrase "discharge of pollutants" includes a discharge from a point source into "navigable waters." § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).

¹⁰ "Navigable waters" is defined under the Act as meaning "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

thority over permitless discharges of dredged and fill material is charged, moreover, to the Administrator.¹¹

Finally, any argument in favor of the Secretary's authority to interpret the reach of the term "navigable waters" for the purposes of § 404 is substantially undercut by the fact that he shares his duties under the section with the Administrator. As outlined above, § 404 authorizes the Administrator to develop guidelines with respect to selection of disposal sites, to approve and oversee State programs for the discharge of dredged or fill material, and to veto on environmental grounds any permit the Secretary proposes to issue.

I, therefore conclude that the structure and intent of the Act support an interpretation of § 404 that gives the Administrator the final administrative responsibility for construing the term "navigable waters."

Your second question is whether the Secretary or the Administrator has the final authority to construe § 404(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f). That subsection exempts certain activities from regulation under §§ 404, 301(a), and 402. The Corps of Engineers has argued that the responsibility for interpretation of the subsection insofar as it relates to the issuance of the Corps' § 404 permits is vested in the Secretary. For reasons similar to those discussed in connection with your first question, I disagree. It is the Administrator who has general administrative responsibility under the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d), and who has general authority to prescribe regulations, 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a). In reviewing the statute and its legislative history, I find no indication that Congress intended that the Secretary have final authority to construe that subsection for purposes of his § 404 program. Absent such an indication, I believe that the Act would be strained by a construction allowing the Secretary to give a different content to § 404(f) than the Administrator gives that subsection as it relates to pollution control provisions apart from § 404. I therefore conclude that final authority under the Act to construe § 404(f) is also vested in the Administrator.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN R. CIVILETTI.

¹¹ 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344(n). The Secretary does have enforcement authority with respect to permitless discharges into navigable waters under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 413. Navigable waters for purposes of that Act have a more restrictive meaning, however, than navigable waters under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. *E.g., National Resources Defense Council v. Callaway*, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).

**CLEAN WATER ACT:
DEFINITION OF “NAVIGABLE WATERS”**

CWA § 502(7), 33 USC § 1362(7)

United States Code Annotated

Title 33. Navigation and Navigable Waters

▣ Chapter 26. Water Pollution Prevention and Control

▣ Subchapter V. General Provisions

→ § 1362. Definitions

Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used in this chapter:

(7) The term “navigable waters” means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.

(8) The term “territorial seas” means the belt of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of three miles.

CLEAN WATER RULE

Note: The Clean Water Rule is codified at 33 CFR Part 328, as well as 40 CFR Parts 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300, 301 and 401.

(Copied from 80 Federal Register 37054, 37104 (June 29, 2015))

§ 328.3 Definitions.

* * * * *

(a) For purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 *et seq.* and its implementing regulations, subject to the exclusions in paragraph (b) of this section, the term “waters of the United States” means:

- (1) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
- (2) All interstate waters, including interstate wetlands;
- (3) The territorial seas;
- (4) All impoundments of waters otherwise identified as waters of the United States under this section;
- (5) All tributaries, as defined in paragraph (c)(3) of this section, of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section;
- (6) All waters adjacent to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section, including wetlands, ponds, lakes, oxbows, impoundments, and similar waters;
- (7) All waters in paragraphs (a)(7)(i) through (v) of this section where they are determined, on a case-specific basis, to have a significant nexus to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. The waters identified in each of paragraphs (a)(7)(i) through (v) of this section are similarly situated and shall be combined, for purposes of a significant nexus analysis, in the watershed that drains to the nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined with waters identified in paragraph (a)(6) of this section when performing a significant nexus analysis. If waters identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent water under paragraph (a)(6), they are an adjacent water and no case-specific significant nexus analysis is required.
 - (i) *Prairie potholes*. Prairie potholes are a complex of glacially formed wetlands, usually occurring in depressions that lack permanent natural outlets, located in the upper Midwest.
 - (ii) *Carolina bays and Delmarva bays*. Carolina bays and Delmarva bays are ponded, depressional wetlands that occur along the Atlantic coastal plain.
 - (iii) *Pocosins*. Pocosins are evergreen shrub and tree dominated wetlands found predominantly along the Central Atlantic coastal plain.
 - (iv) *Western vernal pools*. Western vernal pools are seasonal wetlands located in parts of California and associated with topographic depression, soils with poor drainage, mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers.
 - (v) *Texas coastal prairie wetlands*. Texas coastal prairie wetlands are freshwater wetlands that occur as a mosaic of depressions, ridges, intermound flats, and mima mound wetlands located along the Texas Gulf Coast.
- (8) All waters located within the 100-year floodplain of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section and all waters located within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section where they are determined on a case-specific basis to have a significant nexus to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. For waters determined to have a significant nexus, the entire water is a water of the United States if a portion is located within the 100-year floodplain of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section or within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark. Waters identified in this paragraph shall not be combined with waters identified in paragraph (a)(6) of this section when performing a significant nexus analysis. If waters identified in this paragraph are also an adjacent water under paragraph (a)(6), they are an adjacent water and no case-specific significant nexus analysis is required.

(b) The following are not “waters of the United States” even where they otherwise meet the terms of paragraphs (a)(4) through (8) of this section.

- (1) Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act.
- (2) Prior converted cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an area's status as prior converted cropland by any other Federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.
- (3) The following ditches:
 - (i) Ditches with ephemeral flow that are not a relocated tributary or excavated in a tributary.
 - (ii) Ditches with intermittent flow that are not a relocated tributary, excavated in a tributary, or drain wetlands.
 - (iii) Ditches that do not flow, either directly or through another water, into a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.
- (4) The following features:
 - (i) Artificially irrigated areas that would revert to dry land should application of water to that area cease;
 - (ii) Artificial, constructed lakes and ponds created in dry land such as farm and stock watering ponds, irrigation ponds, settling basins, fields flooded for rice growing, log cleaning ponds, or cooling ponds;
 - (iii) Artificial reflecting pools or swimming pools created in dry land;
 - (iv) Small ornamental waters created in dry land;
 - (v) Water-filled depressions created in dry land incidental to mining or construction activity, including pits excavated for obtaining fill, sand, or gravel that fill with water;
 - (vi) Erosional features, including gullies, rills, and other ephemeral features that do not meet the definition of tributary, non-wetland swales, and lawfully constructed grassed waterways;
 - and
 - (vii) Puddles.
- (5) Groundwater, including groundwater drained through subsurface drainage systems.
- (6) Stormwater control features constructed to convey, treat, or store stormwater that are created in dry land.
- (7) Wastewater recycling structures constructed in dry land; detention and retention basins built for wastewater recycling; groundwater recharge basins; percolation ponds built for wastewater recycling; and water distributary structures built for wastewater recycling.

(c) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions apply:

- (1) *Adjacent*. The term *adjacent* means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section, including waters separated by constructed dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like. For purposes of adjacency, an open water such as a pond or lake includes any wetlands within or abutting its ordinary high water mark. Adjacency is not limited to waters located laterally to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section. Adjacent waters also include all waters that connect segments of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) or are located at the head of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section and are bordering, contiguous, or neighboring such water. Waters being used for established normal farming, ranching, and silviculture activities (33 U.S.C. 1344(f)) are not adjacent.
- (2) *Neighboring*. The term *neighboring* means:
 - (i) All waters located within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section. The entire water is neighboring if a portion is located within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark;
 - (ii) All waters located within the 100- year floodplain of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this section and not more than 1,500 feet from the ordinary high water mark of such water. The entire water is neighboring if a portion is located within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark and within the 100-year floodplain;
 - (iii) All waters located within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(3) of this section, and all waters within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes. The entire water is neighboring if a portion is located within 1,500 feet of the high tide line or within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes.
- (3) *Tributary* and *tributaries*. The terms *tributary* and *tributaries* each mean a water that contributes flow, either directly or through another water (including an impoundment identified in paragraph (a)(4) of this section), to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section that is characterized by the presence of


the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark. These physical indicators demonstrate there is volume, frequency, and duration of flow sufficient to create a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark, and thus to qualify as a tributary. A tributary can be a natural, man-altered, or man-made water and includes waters such as rivers, streams, canals, and ditches not excluded under paragraph (b) of this section. A water that otherwise qualifies as a tributary under this definition does not lose its status as a tributary if, for any length, there are one or more constructed breaks (such as bridges, culverts, pipes, or dams), or one or more natural breaks (such as wetlands along the run of a stream, debris piles, boulder fields, or a stream that flows underground) so long as a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark can be identified upstream of the break. A water that otherwise qualifies as a tributary under this definition does not lose its status as a tributary if it contributes flow through a water of the United States that does not meet the definition of tributary or through a nonjurisdictional water to a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.

- (4) *Wetlands*. The term *wetlands* means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
- (5) *Significant nexus*. The term *significant nexus* means that a water, including wetlands, either alone or in combination with other similarly situated waters in the region, significantly affects the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. The term “in the region” means the watershed that drains to the nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. For an effect to be significant, it must be more than speculative or insubstantial. Waters are similarly situated when they function alike and are sufficiently close to function together in affecting downstream waters. For purposes of determining whether or not a water has a significant nexus, the water’s effect on downstream paragraph (a)(1) through (3) waters shall be assessed by evaluating the aquatic functions identified in paragraphs (c)(5)(i) through (ix) of this section. A water has a significant nexus when any single function or combination of functions performed by the water, alone or together with similarly situated waters in the region, contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the nearest water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section. Functions relevant to the significant nexus evaluation are the following:
 - (i) Sediment trapping,
 - (ii) Nutrient recycling,
 - (iii) Pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering, and transport,
 - (iv) Retention and attenuation of flood waters,
 - (v) Runoff storage,
 - (vi) Contribution of flow,
 - (vii) Export of organic matter,
 - (viii) Export of food resources, and
 - (ix) Provision of life cycle dependent aquatic habitat (such as foraging, feeding, nesting, breeding, spawning, or use as a nursery area) for species located in a water identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section.
- (6) *Ordinary high water mark*. The term *ordinary high water mark* means that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of water and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank, shelving, changes in the character of soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter and debris, or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.
- (7) *High tide line*. The term *high tide line* means the line of intersection of the land with the water’s surface at the maximum height reached by a rising tide. The high tide line may be determined, in the absence of actual data, by a line of oil or scum along shore objects, a more or less continuous deposit of fine shell or debris on the foreshore or berm, other physical markings or characteristics, vegetation lines, tidal gages, or other suitable means that delineate the general height reached by a rising tide. The line encompasses spring high tides and other high tides that occur with periodic frequency but does not include storm surges in which there is a departure from the normal or predicted reach of the tide due to the piling up of water against a coast by strong winds such as those accompanying a hurricane or other intense storm.

* * * * *



Clean Water Act Jurisdiction
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision
in
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States



This memorandum¹ provides guidance to EPA regions and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ["Corps"] districts implementing the Supreme Court's decision in the consolidated cases Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States² (herein referred to simply as "Rapanos") which address the jurisdiction over waters of the United States under the Clean Water Act.³ The chart below summarizes the key points contained in this memorandum. This reference tool is not a substitute for the more complete discussion of issues and guidance furnished throughout the memorandum.

Summary of Key Points

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over the following waters:

- Traditional navigable waters
- Wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters
- Non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters that are relatively permanent where the tributaries typically flow year-round or have continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g., typically three months)
- Wetlands that directly abut such tributaries

The agencies will decide jurisdiction over the following waters based on a fact-specific analysis to determine whether they have a significant nexus with a traditional navigable water:

- Non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively permanent
- Wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively permanent
- Wetlands adjacent to but that do not directly abut a relatively permanent non-navigable tributary

The agencies generally will not assert jurisdiction over the following features:

- Swales or erosional features (e.g., gullies, small washes characterized by low volume, infrequent, or short duration flow)
- Ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated wholly in and draining only uplands and that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of water

The agencies will apply the significant nexus standard as follows:

- A significant nexus analysis will assess the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary itself and the functions performed by all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to determine if they significantly affect the chemical, physical and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters
- Significant nexus includes consideration of hydrologic and ecologic factors

¹ This guidance incorporates revisions to the EPA/Army Memorandum originally issued on June 6, 2007, after careful consideration of public comments received and based on the agencies' experience in implementing the *Rapanos* decision.

² 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).

³ 33 U.S.C. §1251 *et seq.*

Background

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “the Act”) “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.”⁴ One of the mechanisms adopted by Congress to achieve that purpose is a prohibition on the discharge of any pollutants, including dredged or fill material, into “navigable waters” except in compliance with other specified sections of the Act.⁵ In most cases, this means compliance with a permit issued pursuant to CWA §402 or §404. The Act defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source[,]”⁶ and provides that “[t]he term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas[.]”⁷

In Rapanos, the Supreme Court addressed where the Federal government can apply the Clean Water Act, specifically by determining whether a wetland or tributary is a “water of the United States.” The justices issued five separate opinions in Rapanos (one plurality opinion, two concurring opinions, and two dissenting opinions), with no single opinion commanding a majority of the Court.

The Rapanos Decision

Four justices, in a plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia, rejected the argument that the term “waters of the United States” is limited to only those waters that are navigable in the traditional sense and their abutting wetlands.⁸ However, the plurality concluded that the agencies’ regulatory authority should extend only to “relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water” connected to traditional navigable waters, and to “wetlands with a continuous surface connection to” such relatively permanent waters.⁹

Justice Kennedy did not join the plurality’s opinion but instead authored an opinion concurring in the judgment vacating and remanding the cases to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.¹⁰ Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the statutory term “waters of the United States” extends beyond water bodies that are traditionally considered navigable.¹¹ Justice Kennedy, however, found the plurality’s interpretation of the scope of the CWA to be “inconsistent with the Act’s text, structure, and purpose[,]” and he instead presented a different standard for evaluating CWA jurisdiction over wetlands and other water bodies.¹² Justice Kennedy concluded that wetlands are “waters

⁴ 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

⁵ 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), §1362(12)(A).

⁶ 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)

⁷ 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). See also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s).

⁸ Id. at 2220.

⁹ Id. at 2225-27.

¹⁰ Id. at 2236-52. While Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court’s decision to vacate and remand the cases to the Sixth Circuit, his basis for remand was limited to the question of “whether the specific wetlands at issue possess a significant nexus with navigable waters.” 126 S. Ct. at 2252. In contrast, the plurality remanded the cases to determine both “whether the ditches and drains near each wetland are ‘waters,’” and “whether the wetlands in question are ‘adjacent’ to these ‘waters’ in the sense of possessing a continuous surface connection....” Id. at 2235.

¹¹ Id. at 2241.

¹² Id. at 2246.

of the United States” “if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’”¹³

Four justices, in a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Stevens, concluded that EPA’s and the Corps’ interpretation of “waters of the United States” was a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act.¹⁴

When there is no majority opinion in a Supreme Court case, controlling legal principles may be derived from those principles espoused by five or more justices.¹⁵ Thus, regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA exists over a water body if either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s standard is satisfied.¹⁶ Since Rapanos, the United States has filed pleadings in a number of cases interpreting the decision in this manner.

The agencies are issuing this memorandum in recognition of the fact that EPA regions and Corps districts need guidance to ensure that jurisdictional determinations, permitting actions, and other relevant actions are consistent with the decision and supported by the administrative record. Therefore, the agencies have evaluated the Rapanos opinions to identify those waters that are subject to CWA jurisdiction under the reasoning of a majority of the justices. This approach is appropriate for a guidance document. The agencies will continue to monitor implementation of the Rapanos decision in the field and recognize that further consideration of jurisdictional issues, including clarification and definition of key terminology, may be appropriate in the future, either through issuance of additional guidance or through rulemaking.

¹³ Id. at 2248. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurring opinion explaining his agreement with the plurality. See 126 S. Ct. at 2235-36.

¹⁴ Id. at 2252-65. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting opinion explaining his agreement with Justice Stevens’ dissent. See 126 S. Ct. at 2266.

¹⁵ See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 685 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (analyzing the points of agreement between plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions to identify the legal “test ... that lower courts should apply,” under Marks, as the holding of the Court); cf. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2006) (analyzing concurring and dissenting opinions in a prior case to identify a legal conclusion of a majority of the Court); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-282 (2001) (same).

¹⁶ 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Given that all four justices who have joined this opinion would uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in both of these cases – and in all other cases in which either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied – on remand each of the judgments should be reinstated if *either* of those tests is met.”) (emphasis in original). The agencies recognize that the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. McWane, Inc., et al., 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007), has concluded that the Kennedy standard is the sole method of determining CWA jurisdiction in that Circuit. The Supreme Court denied the government’s petition for a writ of *certiorari* on December 1, 2008.

Agency Guidance¹⁷

To ensure that jurisdictional determinations, administrative enforcement actions, and other relevant agency actions are consistent with the Rapanos decision, the agencies in this guidance address which waters are subject to CWA § 404 jurisdiction.¹⁸ Specifically, this guidance identifies those waters over which the agencies will assert jurisdiction categorically and on a case-by-case basis, based on the reasoning of the Rapanos opinions.¹⁹ EPA and the Corps will continually assess and review the application of this guidance to ensure nationwide consistency, reliability, and predictability in our administration of the statute.

1. Traditional Navigable Waters (i.e., “(a)(1) Waters”) and Their Adjacent Wetlands

Key Points

- **The agencies will assert jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters, which includes all the waters described in 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1), and 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(1).**
- **The agencies will assert jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters, including over adjacent wetlands that do not have a continuous surface connection to traditional navigable waters.**

EPA and the Corps will continue to assert jurisdiction over “[a]ll waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or

¹⁷ The CWA provisions and regulations described in this document contain legally binding requirements. This guidance does not substitute for those provisions or regulations, nor is it a regulation itself. It does not impose legally binding requirements on EPA, the Corps, or the regulated community, and may not apply to a particular situation depending on the circumstances. Any decisions regarding a particular water will be based on the applicable statutes, regulations, and case law. Therefore, interested persons are free to raise questions about the appropriateness of the application of this guidance to a particular situation, and EPA and/or the Corps will consider whether or not the recommendations or interpretations of this guidance are appropriate in that situation based on the statutes, regulations, and case law.

¹⁸ This guidance focuses only on those provisions of the agencies’ regulations at issue in Rapanos -- 33 C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a)(1), (a)(5), and (a)(7); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.3(s)(1), (s)(5), and (s)(7). This guidance does not address or affect other subparts of the agencies’ regulations, or response authorities, relevant to the scope of jurisdiction under the CWA. In addition, because this guidance is issued by both the Corps and EPA, which jointly administer CWA § 404, it does not discuss other provisions of the CWA, including §§ 311 and 402, that differ in certain respects from § 404 but share the definition of “waters of the United States.” Indeed, the plurality opinion in Rapanos noted that “... there is no reason to suppose that our construction today significantly affects the enforcement of §1342 ... The Act does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant *directly* to navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather the ‘addition of any pollutant *to* navigable waters.’” (emphasis in original) 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2227. EPA is considering whether to provide additional guidance on these and other provisions of the CWA that may be affected by the Rapanos decision.

¹⁹ In 2001, the Supreme Court held that use of “isolated” non-navigable intrastate waters by migratory birds was not by itself a sufficient basis for the exercise of federal regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). This guidance does not address SWANCC, nor does it affect the Joint Memorandum regarding that decision issued by the General Counsels of EPA and the Department of the Army on January 10, 2003. See 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1995 (Jan. 15, 2003).

foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.”²⁰ These waters are referred to in this guidance as traditional navigable waters.

The agencies will also continue to assert jurisdiction over wetlands “adjacent” to traditional navigable waters as defined in the agencies’ regulations. Under EPA and Corps regulations and as used in this guidance, “adjacent” means “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.” Finding a continuous surface connection is not required to establish adjacency under this definition. The Rapanos decision does not affect the scope of jurisdiction over wetlands that are adjacent to traditional navigable waters because at least five justices agreed that such wetlands are “waters of the United States.”²¹

The regulations define “adjacent” as follows: “The term *adjacent* means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are ‘adjacent wetlands.’”²² Under this definition, the agencies consider wetlands adjacent if one of following three criteria is satisfied. First, there is an unbroken surface or shallow sub-surface connection to jurisdictional waters. This hydrologic connection may be intermittent. Second, they are physically separated from jurisdictional waters by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like. Or third, their proximity to a jurisdictional water is reasonably close, supporting the science-based

²⁰ 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(1). The “(a)(1)” waters include all of the “navigable waters of the United States,” defined in 33 C.F.R. Part 329 and by numerous decisions of the federal courts, plus all other waters that are navigable-in-fact (e.g., the Great Salt Lake, UT and Lake Minnetonka MN). For purposes of CWA jurisdiction and this guidance, waters will be considered traditional navigable waters if:

- They are subject to Section 9 or 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, or
- A federal court has determined that the water body is navigable-in-fact under federal law, or
- They are waters currently being used for commercial navigation, including commercial water-borne recreation (e.g., boat rentals, guided fishing trips, water ski tournaments, etc.), or
- They have historically been used for commercial navigation, including commercial water-borne recreation; or
- They are susceptible to being used in the future for commercial navigation, including commercial water-borne recreation. Susceptibility for future use may be determined by examining a number of factors, including the physical characteristics and capacity of the water (e.g., size, depth, and flow velocity, etc.) to be used in commercial navigation, including commercial recreational navigation, and the likelihood of future commercial navigation or commercial water-borne recreation. Evidence of future commercial navigation use, including commercial water-borne recreation (e.g., development plans, plans for water dependent events, etc.), must be clearly documented. Susceptibility to future commercial navigation, including commercial water-borne recreation, will not be supported when the evidence is insubstantial or speculative. Use of average flow statistics may not accurately represent streams with “flashy” flow characteristics. In such circumstances, daily gage data is more representative of flow characteristics.

²¹ *Id.* at 2248 (Justice Kennedy, concurring) (“As applied to wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’ conclusive standard for jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable inference of ecologic interconnection, and the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the Act by showing adjacency alone.”).

²² 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c).

inference that such wetlands have an ecological interconnection with jurisdictional waters.²³ Because of the scientific basis for this inference, determining whether a wetland is reasonably close to a jurisdictional water does not generally require a case-specific demonstration of an ecologic interconnection. In the case of a jurisdictional water and a reasonably close wetland, such implied ecological interconnectivity is neither speculative nor insubstantial. For example, species, such as amphibians or anadromous and catadromous fish, move between such waters for spawning and their life stage requirements. Migratory species, however, shall not be used to support an ecologic interconnection. In assessing whether a wetland is reasonably close to a jurisdictional water, the proximity of the wetland (including all parts of a single wetland that has been divided by road crossings, ditches, berms, etc.) in question will be evaluated and shall not be evaluated together with other wetlands in the area.

2. Relatively Permanent Non-navigable Tributaries of Traditional Navigable Waters and Wetlands with a Continuous Surface Connection with Such Tributaries

Key Points

- **The agencies will assert jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters that are relatively permanent where the tributaries typically flow year-round or have continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g., typically three months).**
- **The agencies will assert jurisdiction over those adjacent wetlands that have a continuous surface connection to such tributaries (e.g., they are not separated by uplands, a berm, dike, or similar feature.)**

A non-navigable tributary²⁴ of a traditional navigable water is a non-navigable water body whose waters flow into a traditional navigable water either directly or indirectly by means of other tributaries. Both the plurality opinion and the dissent would uphold CWA jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries that are “relatively permanent” – waters that typically (e.g., except due to drought) flow year-round or waters that have a

²³ See e.g., *United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.*, 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (“...the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the Act.”).

²⁴ A tributary includes natural, man-altered, or man-made water bodies that carry flow directly or indirectly into a traditional navigable water. Furthermore, a tributary, for the purposes of this guidance, is the entire reach of the stream that is of the same order (i.e., from the point of confluence, where two lower order streams meet to form the tributary, downstream to the point such tributary enters a higher order stream). The flow characteristics of a particular tributary generally will be evaluated at the farthest downstream limit of such tributary (i.e., the point the tributary enters a higher order stream). However, for purposes of determining whether the tributary is relatively permanent, where data indicates the flow regime at the downstream limit is not representative of the entire tributary (as described above) (e.g., where data indicates the tributary is relatively permanent at its downstream limit but not for the majority of its length, or vice versa), the flow regime that best characterizes the entire tributary should be used. A primary factor in making this determination is the relative lengths of segments with differing flow regimes. It is reasonable for the agencies to treat the entire tributary in light of the Supreme Court’s observation that the phrase “navigable waters” generally refers to “rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features.” 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (Justice Scalia, quoting *Riverside Bayview*, 474 U.S. at 131). The entire reach of a stream is a reasonably identifiable hydrographic feature. The agencies will also use this characterization of tributary when applying the significant nexus standard under Section 3 of this guidance.

continuous flow at least seasonally (e.g., typically three months).²⁵ Justice Scalia emphasizes that relatively permanent waters do not include tributaries “whose flow is ‘coming and going at intervals ... broken, fitful.’”²⁶ Therefore, “relatively permanent” waters do not include ephemeral tributaries which flow only in response to precipitation and intermittent streams which do not typically flow year-round or have continuous flow at least seasonally. However, CWA jurisdiction over these waters will be evaluated under the significant nexus standard described below. The agencies will assert jurisdiction over relatively permanent non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters without a legal obligation to make a significant nexus finding.

In addition, the agencies will assert jurisdiction over those adjacent wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with a relatively permanent, non-navigable tributary, without the legal obligation to make a significant nexus finding. As explained above, the plurality opinion and the dissent agree that such wetlands are jurisdictional.²⁷ The plurality opinion indicates that “continuous surface connection” is a “physical connection requirement.”²⁸ Therefore, a continuous surface connection exists between a wetland and a relatively permanent tributary where the wetland directly abuts the tributary (e.g., they are not separated by uplands, a berm, dike, or similar feature).²⁹

²⁵ See 126 S. Ct. at 2221 n. 5 (Justice Scalia, plurality opinion) (explaining that “relatively permanent” does not necessarily exclude waters “that might dry up in extraordinary circumstances such as drought” or “seasonal rivers, which contain continuous flow during some months of the year but no flow during dry months”).

²⁶ *Id.* (internal citations omitted)

²⁷ *Id.* at 2226-27 (Justice Scalia, plurality opinion).

²⁸ *Id.* at 2232 n.13 (referring to “our physical-connection requirement” and later stating that Riverside Bayview does not reject “the physical-connection requirement”) and 2234 (“Wetlands are ‘waters of the United States’ if they bear the ‘significant nexus’ of physical connection, which makes them as a practical matter *indistinguishable* from waters of the United States.”) (emphasis in original). See also 126 S. Ct. at 2230 (“adjacent” means “physically abutting”) and 2229 (citing to Riverside Bayview as “confirm[ing] that the scope of ambiguity of ‘the waters of the United States’ is determined by a wetland’s *physical connection* to covered waters...” (emphasis in original)). A continuous surface connection does not require surface water to be continuously present between the wetland and the tributary. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) and 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (defining wetlands as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support ... a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions”).

²⁹ While all wetlands that meet the agencies’ definitions are considered adjacent wetlands, only those adjacent wetlands that have a continuous surface connection because they directly abut the tributary (e.g., they are not separated by uplands, a berm, dike, or similar feature) are considered jurisdictional under the plurality standard.

3. *Certain Adjacent Wetlands and Non-navigable Tributaries That Are Not Relatively Permanent*

Key Points

- The agencies will assert jurisdiction over non-navigable, not relatively permanent tributaries and their adjacent wetlands where such tributaries and wetlands have a significant nexus to a traditional navigable water.
- A significant nexus analysis will assess the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary itself and the functions performed by any wetlands adjacent to the tributary to determine if they significantly affect the chemical, physical and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters.
- “Similarly situated” wetlands include all wetlands adjacent to the same tributary.
- Significant nexus includes consideration of hydrologic factors including the following:
 - volume, duration, and frequency of flow, including consideration of certain physical characteristics of the tributary
 - proximity to the traditional navigable water
 - size of the watershed
 - average annual rainfall
 - average annual winter snow pack
- Significant nexus also includes consideration of ecologic factors including the following:
 - potential of tributaries to carry pollutants and flood waters to traditional navigable waters
 - provision of aquatic habitat that supports a traditional navigable water
 - potential of wetlands to trap and filter pollutants or store flood waters
 - maintenance of water quality in traditional navigable waters
- The following geographic features generally are not jurisdictional waters:
 - swales or erosional features (e.g. gullies, small washes characterized by low volume, infrequent, or short duration flow)
 - ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated wholly in and draining only uplands and that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of water

The agencies will assert jurisdiction over the following types of waters when they have a significant nexus with a traditional navigable water: (1) non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively permanent,³⁰ (2) wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively permanent, and (3) wetlands adjacent to, but not directly abutting, a relatively permanent tributary (e.g., separated from it by uplands, a berm, dike or similar feature).³¹ As described below, the agencies will assess the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary itself, together with the functions performed by any wetlands adjacent to that tributary, to determine whether collectively they have a significant nexus with traditional navigable waters.

³⁰ For simplicity, the term “tributary” when used alone in this section refers to non-navigable tributaries that are not relatively permanent.

³¹ As described in Section 2 of this guidance, the agencies will assert jurisdiction, without the need for a significant nexus finding, over all wetlands that are both adjacent and have a continuous surface connection to relatively permanent tributaries. *See* pp. 6-7, *supra*.

The agencies' assertion of jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands that have a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters is supported by five justices. Justice Kennedy applied the significant nexus standard to the wetlands at issue in Rapanos and Carabell: "[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase 'navigable waters,' if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.'" ³² While Justice Kennedy's opinion discusses the significant nexus standard primarily in the context of wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, ³³ his opinion also addresses Clean Water Act jurisdiction over tributaries themselves. Justice Kennedy states that, based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, "the connection between a non-navigable water or wetland may be so close, or potentially so close, that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a 'navigable water' under the Act. ... Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is lacking." ³⁴ Thus, Justice Kennedy would limit jurisdiction to those waters that have a significant nexus with traditional navigable waters, although his opinion focuses on the specific factors and functions the agencies should consider in evaluating significant nexus for adjacent wetlands, rather than for tributaries.

In considering how to apply the significant nexus standard, the agencies have focused on the integral relationship between the ecological characteristics of tributaries and those of their adjacent wetlands, which determines in part their contribution to restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's traditional navigable waters. The ecological relationship between tributaries and their adjacent wetlands is well documented in the scientific literature and reflects their physical proximity as well as shared hydrological and biological characteristics. The flow parameters and ecological functions that Justice Kennedy describes as most relevant to an evaluation of significant nexus result from the ecological inter-relationship between tributaries and their adjacent wetlands. For example, the duration, frequency, and volume of flow in a tributary, and subsequently the flow in downstream navigable waters, is directly affected by the presence of adjacent wetlands that hold floodwaters, intercept sheet flow from uplands, and then release waters to tributaries in a more even and constant manner. Wetlands may also help to maintain more consistent water temperature in tributaries, which is important for some aquatic species. Adjacent wetlands trap and hold pollutants that may otherwise reach tributaries (and downstream navigable waters) including sediments, chemicals, and other pollutants. Tributaries and their adjacent wetlands provide habitat (e.g., feeding, nesting, spawning, or rearing young) for many aquatic species that also live in traditional navigable waters.

³² Id. at 2248. When applying the significant nexus standard to tributaries and wetlands, it is important to apply it within the limits of jurisdiction articulated in SWANCC. Justice Kennedy cites SWANCC with approval and asserts that the significant nexus standard, rather than being articulated for the first time in Rapanos, was established in SWANCC. 126 S. Ct. at 2246 (describing SWANCC as "interpreting the Act to require a significant nexus with navigable waters"). It is clear, therefore, that Justice Kennedy did not intend for the significant nexus standard to be applied in a manner that would result in assertion of jurisdiction over waters that he and the other justices determined were not jurisdictional in SWANCC. Nothing in this guidance should be interpreted as providing authority to assert jurisdiction over waters deemed non-jurisdictional by SWANCC.

³³ 126 S. Ct. at 2247-50.

³⁴ Id. at 2241 (emphasis added).

When performing a significant nexus analysis,³⁵ the first step is to determine if the tributary has any adjacent wetlands. Where a tributary has no adjacent wetlands, the agencies will consider the flow characteristics and functions of only the tributary itself in determining whether such tributary has a significant effect on the chemical, physical and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters. A tributary, as characterized in Section 2 above, is the entire reach of the stream that is of the same order (i.e., from the point of confluence, where two lower order streams meet to form the tributary, downstream to the point such tributary enters a higher order stream). For purposes of demonstrating a connection to traditional navigable waters, it is appropriate and reasonable to assess the flow characteristics of the tributary at the point at which water is in fact being contributed to a higher order tributary or to a traditional navigable water. If the tributary has adjacent wetlands, the significant nexus evaluation needs to recognize the ecological relationship between tributaries and their adjacent wetlands, and their closely linked role in protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters.

Therefore, the agencies will consider the flow and functions of the tributary together with the functions performed by all the wetlands adjacent to that tributary in evaluating whether a significant nexus is present. Similarly, where evaluating significant nexus for an adjacent wetland, the agencies will consider the flow characteristics and functions performed by the tributary to which the wetland is adjacent along with the functions performed by the wetland and all other wetlands adjacent to that tributary. This approach reflects the agencies' interpretation of Justice Kennedy's term "similarly situated" to include all wetlands adjacent to the same tributary. Where it is determined that a tributary and its adjacent wetlands collectively have a significant nexus with traditional navigable waters, the tributary and all of its adjacent wetlands are jurisdictional. Application of the significant nexus standard in this way is reasonable because of its strong scientific foundation – that is, the integral ecological relationship between a tributary and its adjacent wetlands. Interpreting the phrase "similarly situated" to include all wetlands adjacent to the same tributary is reasonable because such wetlands are physically located in a like manner (i.e., lying adjacent to the same tributary).

Principal considerations when evaluating significant nexus include the volume, duration, and frequency of the flow of water in the tributary and the proximity of the tributary to a traditional navigable water. In addition to any available hydrologic information (e.g., gauge data, flood predictions, historic records of water flow, statistical data, personal observations/records, etc.), the agencies may reasonably consider certain physical characteristics of the tributary to characterize its flow, and thus help to inform the determination of whether or not a significant nexus is present between the tributary and downstream traditional navigable waters. Physical indicators of flow may include the presence and characteristics of a reliable ordinary high water mark (OHWM) with a channel defined by bed and banks.³⁶ Other physical indicators of flow may include

³⁵ In discussing the significant nexus standard, Justice Kennedy stated: "The required nexus must be assessed in terms of the statute's goals and purposes. Congress enacted the [CWA] to 'restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters' ..." 126 S. Ct. at 2248. Consistent with Justice Kennedy's instruction, EPA and the Corps will apply the significant nexus standard in a manner that restores and maintains any of these three attributes of traditional navigable waters.

³⁶ See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(e). The OHWM also serves to define the lateral limit of jurisdiction in a non-navigable tributary where there are no adjacent wetlands. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c). While EPA regions

shelving, wracking, water staining, sediment sorting, and scour.³⁷ Consideration will also be given to certain relevant contextual factors that directly influence the hydrology of tributaries including the size of the tributary's watershed, average annual rainfall, average annual winter snow pack, slope, and channel dimensions.

In addition, the agencies will consider other relevant factors, including the functions performed by the tributary together with the functions performed by any adjacent wetlands. One such factor is the extent to which the tributary and adjacent wetlands have the capacity to carry pollutants (e.g., petroleum wastes, toxic wastes, sediment) or flood waters to traditional navigable waters, or to reduce the amount of pollutants or flood waters that would otherwise enter traditional navigable waters.³⁸ The agencies will also evaluate ecological functions performed by the tributary and any adjacent wetlands which affect downstream traditional navigable waters, such as the capacity to transfer nutrients and organic carbon vital to support downstream foodwebs (e.g., macroinvertebrates present in headwater streams convert carbon in leaf litter making it available to species downstream), habitat services such as providing spawning areas for recreationally or commercially important species in downstream waters, and the extent to which the tributary and adjacent wetlands perform functions related to maintenance of downstream water quality such as sediment trapping.

After assessing the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary and its adjacent wetlands, the agencies will evaluate whether the tributary and its adjacent wetlands are likely to have an effect that is more than speculative or insubstantial on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of a traditional navigable water. As the distance from the tributary to the navigable water increases, it will become increasingly important to document whether the tributary and its adjacent wetlands have a significant nexus rather than a speculative or insubstantial nexus with a traditional navigable water.

Accordingly, Corps districts and EPA regions shall document in the administrative record the available information regarding whether a tributary and its adjacent wetlands have a significant nexus with a traditional navigable water, including the physical indicators of flow in a particular case and available information regarding the functions of the tributary and any adjacent wetlands. The agencies will explain their basis for concluding whether or not the tributary and its adjacent wetlands, when considered together, have a more than speculative or insubstantial effect on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of a traditional navigable water.

Swales or erosional features (e.g., gullies, small washes characterized by low volume, infrequent, or short duration flow) are generally not waters of the United States

and Corps districts must exercise judgment to identify the OHWM on a case-by-case basis, the Corps' regulations identify the factors to be applied. These regulations have recently been further explained in Regulatory Guidance Letter (RGL) 05-05 (Dec. 7, 2005). The agencies will apply the regulations and the RGL and take other steps as needed to ensure that the OHWM identification factors are applied consistently nationwide.

³⁷ See Justice Kennedy's discussion of "physical characteristics," 126 S. Ct. at 2248-2249.

³⁸ See, generally, 126 S. Ct. at 2248-53; see also 126 S. Ct. at 2249 ("Just as control over the non-navigable parts of a river may be essential or desirable in the interests of the navigable portions, so may the key to flood control on a navigable stream be found in whole or in part in flood control on its tributaries....") (citing to Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 524-25(1941)).

because they are not tributaries or they do not have a significant nexus to downstream traditional navigable waters. In addition, ditches (including roadside ditches) excavated wholly in and draining only uplands and that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of water are generally not waters of the United States because they are not tributaries or they do not have a significant nexus to downstream traditional navigable waters.³⁹ Even when not jurisdictional waters subject to CWA §404, these geographic features (e.g., swales, ditches) may still contribute to a surface hydrologic connection between an adjacent wetland and a traditional navigable water. In addition, these geographic features may function as point sources (i.e., “discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances”), such that discharges of pollutants to other waters through these features could be subject to other CWA regulations (e.g., CWA §§ 311 and 402).⁴⁰

Certain ephemeral waters in the arid west are distinguishable from the geographic features described above where such ephemeral waters are tributaries and they have a significant nexus to downstream traditional navigable waters. For example, in some cases these ephemeral tributaries may serve as a transitional area between the upland environment and the traditional navigable waters. During and following precipitation events, ephemeral tributaries collect and transport water and sometimes sediment from the upper reaches of the landscape downstream to the traditional navigable waters. These ephemeral tributaries may provide habitat for wildlife and aquatic organisms in downstream traditional navigable waters. These biological and physical processes may further support nutrient cycling, sediment retention and transport, pollutant trapping and filtration, and improvement of water quality, functions that may significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream traditional navigable waters.

Documentation

As described above, the agencies will assert CWA jurisdiction over the following waters without the legal obligation to make a significant nexus determination: traditional navigable waters and wetlands adjacent thereto, non-navigable tributaries that are relatively permanent waters, and wetlands with a continuous surface connection with such tributaries. The agencies will also decide CWA jurisdiction over other non-navigable tributaries and over other wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries based on a fact-specific analysis to determine whether they have a significant nexus with traditional navigable waters. For purposes of CWA §404 determinations by the Corps, the Corps and EPA are developing a revised form to be used by field regulators for documenting the assertion or declination of CWA jurisdiction.


Corps districts and EPA regions will ensure that the information in the record adequately supports any jurisdictional determination. The record shall, to the maximum extent practicable, explain the rationale for the determination, disclose the data and information relied upon, and, if applicable, explain what data or information received greater or lesser weight, and what professional judgment or assumptions were used in reaching the determination. The Corps districts and EPA regions will also demonstrate and document in the record that a particular water either fits within a class identified above as not requiring a significant nexus determination, or that the water has a

³⁹ See 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).


⁴⁰ 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).

significant nexus with a traditional navigable water. As a matter of policy, Corps districts and EPA regions will include in the record any available information that documents the existence of a significant nexus between a relatively permanent tributary that is not perennial (and its adjacent wetlands if any) and a traditional navigable water, even though a significant nexus finding is not required as a matter of law.

All pertinent documentation and analyses for a given jurisdictional determination (including the revised form) shall be adequately reflected in the record and clearly demonstrate the basis for asserting or declining CWA jurisdiction.⁴¹ Maps, aerial photography, soil surveys, watershed studies, local development plans, literature citations, and references from studies pertinent to the parameters being reviewed are examples of information that will assist staff in completing accurate jurisdictional determinations. The level of documentation may vary among projects. For example, jurisdictional determinations for complex projects may require additional documentation by the project manager.



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⁴¹ For jurisdictional determinations and permitting decisions, such information shall be posted on the appropriate Corps website for public and interagency information.

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(Cite as: 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208)



Supreme Court of the United States
John A. RAPANOS, et al., Petitioners,
v.

UNITED STATES.

June Carabell et al., Petitioners,
v.

United States Army Corps of Engineers et al.
Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384.

Argued Feb. 21, 2006.
Decided June 19, 2006.

Background: Federal government brought enforcement action alleging that developers and their wholly-owned companies illegally discharged fill material into protected wetlands, in violation of Clean Water Act (CWA). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, [Bernard A. Friedman](#), Chief Judge, entered judgment in favor of government, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, [376 F.3d 629](#), affirmed. In a separate action, property owners whose request for permit to fill property was denied brought action against government entities, seeking judicial review under Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, [Paul D. Borman](#), J., granted summary judgment for government, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, [391 F.3d 704](#), affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Justice [Scalia](#), announced the judgment of the court, holding that: (1) term “navigable waters,” under CWA, includes only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water, not intermittent or ephemeral flows of water, and

(2) only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right are adjacent to such waters and covered by the CWA.

Vacated and remanded.

Chief Justice [Roberts](#) filed a concurring opinion.

Justice [Kennedy](#) filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Justice [Stevens](#) filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices [Souter](#), [Ginsburg](#), and [Breyer](#) joined.

Justice [Breyer](#) filed a dissenting opinion.

****2211 *715 Syllabus** ^{FN*}

^{FN*} The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See [United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.](#), 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.

As relevant here, the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) makes it unlawful to discharge dredged or fill material into “navigable waters” without a permit, [33 U.S.C. §§ 1311\(a\), 1342\(a\)](#), and defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,” [§ 1362\(7\)](#). The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), which issues permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters, interprets “the waters of the United States” expansively to include not only traditional navigable waters, [33 CFR § 328.3\(a\)\(1\)](#), but also other defined waters, [§ 328.3\(a\)\(2\)](#), (3); “[t]ributaries” of such waters, [§ 328.3\(a\)\(5\)](#); and wetlands “adjacent” to such waters and tributaries, [§ 328.3\(a\)\(7\)](#). “[A]djacent” wetlands include those “bordering, contiguous [to], or neighboring” waters of the United States even when they are “separated from [such] waters ... by man-made dikes ... and the like.” [§ 328.3\(c\)](#).

These cases involve four Michigan wetlands lying near ditches or man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters. In No. 04-1034, the United States brought civil enforcement proceedings against the Rapanos petitioners, who had back-filled three of the areas without a permit. The District Court found federal jurisdiction over the wetlands because they were adjacent to “waters of the United States” and held petitioners liable for CWA viola-

547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 62 ERC 1481, 165 L.Ed.2d 159, 74 USLW 4365, 36 Env'tl. L. Rep. 20,116, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5260, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7661, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 275
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tions. Affirming, the Sixth Circuit found federal jurisdiction based on the sites' hydrologic connections to the nearby ditches or drains, or to more remote navigable waters. In No. 04-1384, the Carabell petitioners were denied a permit to deposit fill in a wetland that was separated from a drainage ditch by an impermeable berm. The Carabells sued, but the District Court found federal jurisdiction over the site. Affirming, the Sixth Circuit held that the wetland was adjacent to navigable waters.

Held: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded.

****2212** No. 04-1034, [376 F.3d 629](#), and No. 04-1384, [391 F.3d 704](#), vacated and remanded.

Justice [SCALIA](#), joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice THOMAS, and Justice ALITO, concluded:

***716** I. The phrase “the waters of the United States” includes only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water “forming geographic features” that are described in ordinary parlance as “streams,” “oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed.), and does not include channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall. The Corps' expansive interpretation of that phrase is thus not “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694. Pp. 2220-2225.

(a) While the meaning of “navigable waters” in the CWA is broader than the traditional definition found in *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L.Ed. 999, see *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers*, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (SWANCC); *United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.*, 474 U.S. 121, 133, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419, the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction only over “waters.” The use of the definite article “the” and the plural number “waters” show plainly that [§ 1362\(7\)](#) does not refer to water in general, but more narrowly to water “[a]s found in streams,” “oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed.). Those terms all connote relatively permanent bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through

which water occasionally or intermittently flows. Pp. 2220-2222.

(b) The Act's use of the traditional phrase “navigable waters” further confirms that the CWA confers jurisdiction only over relatively permanent bodies of water. Traditionally, such “waters” included only discrete bodies of water, and the term still carries some of its original substance, *SWANCC, supra*, at 172, 121 S.Ct. 675. This Court's subsequent interpretation of “the waters of the United States” in the CWA likewise confirms this limitation. See, e.g., *Riverside Bayview, supra*, at 131, 106 S.Ct. 455. And the CWA itself categorizes the channels and conduits that typically carry intermittent flows of water separately from “navigable waters,” including them in the definition of “‘point sources,’ ” [33 U.S.C. § 1362\(14\)](#). Moreover, only the foregoing definition of “waters” is consistent with the CWA's stated policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States ... to plan the development and use ... of land and water resources” [§ 1251\(b\)](#). In addition, “the waters of the United States” hardly qualifies as the clear and manifest statement from Congress needed to authorize intrusion into such an area of traditional state authority as land-use regulation; and to authorize federal action that stretches the limits of Congress's commerce power. See *SWANCC, supra*, at 173, 121 S.Ct. 675. Pp. 2222-2225.

2. A wetland may not be considered “adjacent to” remote “waters of the United States” based on a mere hydrologic connection. *Riverside Bayview* rested on an inherent ambiguity in defining where the “water” ends and its abutting (“adjacent”) wetlands begin, permitting the Corps to rely on ecological considerations only to resolve that ambiguity in favor of treating all abutting wetlands as waters. Isolated ponds are not “waters of the United States” in their own right, see *SWANCC, supra*, at 167, 171, 121 S.Ct. 675, and present no boundary-drawing problem justifying the invocation of such ecological factors. Thus, only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are “waters of the United States” in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between the two, are “adjacent” to such waters and covered by the Act. Establishing coverage of the Rapanos and Carabell sites requires finding that the adjacent channel contains a relatively permanent “wate[r] of the United States,” and that

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each wetland has a continuous surface connection to that water, making it difficult to determine where the water ends and the wetland begins. Pp. 2225-2227.

3. Because the Sixth Circuit applied an incorrect standard to determine whether the wetlands at issue are covered "waters," and because of the paucity of the record, the cases are remanded for further proceedings. P. 2235.

Justice [KENNEDY](#) concluded that the Sixth Circuit correctly recognized that a water or wetland constitutes "navigable waters" under the Act if it possesses a "significant nexus" to waters that are navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made, *Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers*, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 172, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (SWANCC), but did not consider all the factors necessary to determine that the lands in question had, or did not have, the requisite nexus. *United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.*, 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419, and SWANCC establish the framework for the inquiry here. The nexus required must be assessed in terms of the Act's goals and purposes. Congress enacted the law to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), and it pursued that objective by restricting dumping and filling in "waters of the United States," §§ 1311(a), 1362(12). The rationale for the Act's wetlands regulation, as the Corps has recognized, is that wetlands can perform critical functions related to the integrity of other waters—such as pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff storage. 33 CFR § 320.4(b)(2). Accordingly, wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase "navigable waters," if the wetlands, alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters understood as navigable in the traditional sense. When, in contrast, their effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by the term *718 "navigable waters." Because the Corps' theory of jurisdiction in these cases—adjacency to tributaries, however remote and insubstantial—goes beyond the *Riverside Bayview* holding, its assertion of jurisdiction cannot rest on that case. The breadth of the Corps' existing standard for tributaries—which seems to leave room for regulating drains, ditches, and streams remote from any naviga-

ble-in-fact water and carrying only minor water-volumes toward it—precludes that standard's adoption as the determinative measure of whether adjacent wetlands are likely to play an important role in the integrity of an aquatic system comprising navigable waters as traditionally understood. Absent more specific regulations, the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis when seeking to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries, in order to avoid unreasonable applications of the Act. In the instant cases the record contains evidence pointing to a possible significant **2214 nexus, but neither the agency nor the reviewing courts considered the issue in these terms. Thus, the cases should be remanded for further proceedings. Pp. 2236-2252.

[SCALIA](#), J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which [ROBERTS](#), C. J., and [THOMAS](#) and [ALITO](#), JJ., joined. [ROBERTS](#), C. J., filed a concurring opinion, *post*, p. 2235. [KENNEDY](#), J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, *post*, p. 2236. [STEVENS](#), J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which [SOUTER](#), [GINSBURG](#), and [BREYER](#), JJ., joined, *post*, p. 2252. [BREYER](#), J., filed a dissenting opinion, *post*, p. 2266. [M. Reed Hopper](#), [Robin L. Rivett](#), Sacramento, California, for Petitioners in No. 04-1034.

[Timothy A. Stoecker](#), [Dennis W. Archer](#), [Paul R. Bernard](#), Dickinson Wright PLLC, Detroit, MI, for Petitioners in No. 04-1384.

[Paul D. Clement](#), Solicitor General, [Sue Ellen Wooldridge](#), Assistant Attorney General, [Thomas G. Hungar](#), Deputy Solicitor General, [Malcolm L. Stewart](#), Assistant to the Solicitor General, Greer S. Goldman, Ellen J. Durkee, [Todd S. Kim](#), [Katherine W. Hazard](#), Washington, D.C., for United States.

For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:2005 WL 3295630 (Pet.Brief)2006 WL 123765 (Resp.Brief)2006 WL 338849 (Reply.Brief)

Justice [SCALIA](#) announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice THOMAS, and Justice ALITO join.

*719 In April 1989, petitioner John A. Rapanos backfilled wetlands on a parcel of land in Michigan

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that he owned and *720 sought to develop. This parcel included 54 acres of land with sometimes-saturated soil conditions. The nearest body of navigable water was 11 to 20 miles away. [339 F.3d 447, 449 \(C.A.6 2003\)](#) (*Rapanos I*). Regulators had informed Mr. Rapanos that his saturated fields were “waters of the United States,” [33 U.S.C. § 1362\(7\)](#), that could not be filled *721 without a permit. Twelve years of criminal and civil litigation ensued.

The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is not trivial. In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot, relying on such factors as “economics,” “aesthetics,” “recreation,” and “in general, the needs and welfare of the people,” [33 CFR § 320.4\(a\)](#) (2004).^{FN1} The average applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and \$271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and \$28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design changes. Sunding & Zilberman, *The Economics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process*, 42 *Natural Resources J.* 59, 74-76 (2002). “[O]ver \$1.7 billion is spent each year by the private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.” *Id.*, at 81. These costs cannot be avoided, because the Clean Water Act “impose[s] criminal liability,” as well as steep civil fines, “on a broad range of ordinary industrial and commercial activities.” **2215 *Hanousek v. United States*, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103, 120 S.Ct. 860, 145 L.Ed.2d 710 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In this litigation, for example, for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos faced 63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal and civil fines. See *United States v. Rapanos*, 235 F.3d 256, 260 (C.A.6 2000).

^{FN1}. In issuing permits, the Corps directs that “[a]ll factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof: among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and conservation, wa-

ter quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people.” [§ 320.4\(a\)](#).

*722 The enforcement proceedings against Mr. Rapanos are a small part of the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water Act—without any change in the governing statute—during the past five Presidential administrations. In the last three decades, the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have interpreted their jurisdiction over “the waters of the United States” to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the United States—including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower 48 States. And that was just the beginning. The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit—whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or ephemeral—through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or intermittently flow. On this view, the federally regulated “waters of the United States” include storm drains, roadside ditches, ripples of sand in the desert that may contain water once a year, and lands that are covered by floodwaters once every 100 years. Because they include the land containing storm sewers and desert washes, the statutory “waters of the United States” engulf entire cities and immense arid wastelands. In fact, the entire land area of the United States lies in some drainage basin, and an endless network of visible channels furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally wherever the rain falls. Any plot of land containing such a channel may potentially be regulated as a “water of the United States.”

I

Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act) in 1972. The Act's stated objective is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.” 86 Stat. 816, [33 U.S.C. § 1251\(a\)](#). The Act also states that “[i]t is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan *723 the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise

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of his authority under this chapter.” [§ 1251\(b\)](#).

One of the statute's principal provisions is [33 U.S.C. § 1311\(a\)](#), which provides that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” “The discharge of a pollutant” is defined broadly to include “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” [§ 1362\(12\)](#), and “pollutant” is defined broadly to include not only traditional contaminants but also solids such as “dredged spoil, ... rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt,” [§ 1362\(6\)](#). And, most relevant here, the CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” [§ 1362\(7\)](#).

The Act also provides certain exceptions to its prohibition of “the discharge of any pollutant by any person.” [§ 1311\(a\)](#). [Section 1342\(a\)](#) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to “issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, ... notwithstanding [section 1311\(a\)](#) of this title.” [Section 1344](#) authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to “issue permits ... for the discharge of dredged ****2216** or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” [§ 1344\(a\), \(d\)](#). It is the discharge of “dredged or fill material”—which, unlike traditional water pollutants, are solids that do not readily wash downstream—that we consider today.

For a century prior to the CWA, we had interpreted the phrase “navigable waters of the United States” in the Act's predecessor statutes to refer to interstate waters that are “navigable in fact” or readily susceptible of being rendered so. *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. 557, 563, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1871); see also *United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.*, 311 U.S. 377, 406, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1940). After passage of the CWA, the Corps initially adopted this traditional judicial definition for the Act's term “navigable waters.” See 39 Fed.Reg. 12119, codified at 33 CFR § 209.120(d)(1) (1974); see also **724Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers*, 531 U.S. 159, 168, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001) (*SWANCC*). After a District Court enjoined these regulations as too narrow, *Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway*, 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (DC 1975), the Corps adopted a far broader definition. See 40 Fed.Reg. 31324-31325 (1975); 42 Fed.Reg. 37144 (1977). The Corps' new regulations deliberately sought to extend the definition of “the waters of the United States” to the outer

limits of Congress's commerce power. See *id.*, at 37144, n. 2.

The Corps' current regulations interpret “the waters of the United States” to include, in addition to traditional interstate navigable waters, [33 CFR § 328.3\(a\)\(1\)](#) (2004), “[a]ll interstate waters including interstate wetlands,” [§ 328.3\(a\)\(2\)](#); “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” [§ 328.3\(a\)\(3\)](#); “[t]ributaries of [such] waters,” [§ 328.3\(a\)\(5\)](#); and “[w]etlands adjacent to [such] waters [and tributaries] (other than waters that are themselves wetlands),” [§ 328.3\(a\)\(7\)](#). The regulation defines “adjacent” wetlands as those “bordering, contiguous [to], or neighboring” waters of the United States. [§ 328.3\(c\)](#). It specifically provides that “[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are ‘adjacent wetlands.’” *Ibid.*

We first addressed the proper interpretation of [33 U.S.C. § 1362\(7\)](#)'s phrase “the waters of the United States” in *United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.*, 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985). That case concerned a wetland that “was adjacent to a body of navigable water,” because “the area characterized by saturated soil conditions and wetland vegetation extended beyond the boundary of respondent's property to ... a navigable waterway.” *Id.*, at 131, 106 S.Ct. 455; see also [33 CFR § 328.3\(b\)](#). Noting that “the transition from water to solid ***725** ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one,” and that “the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins,” 474 U.S., at 132, 106 S.Ct. 455, we upheld the Corps' interpretation of “the waters of the United States” to include wetlands that “actually abut[ed] on” traditional navigable waters. *Id.*, at 135, 106 S.Ct. 455.

Following our decision in *Riverside Bayview*, the Corps adopted increasingly broad interpretations of its own regulations under the Act. For example, in 1986, to “clarify” the reach of its jurisdiction, the Corps announced the so-called “Migratory Bird Rule,” which purported to extend its ****2217** jurisdic-

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(Cite as: 547 U.S. 715, 126 S.Ct. 2208)

tion to any intrastate waters “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat” by migratory birds. [51 Fed.Reg. 41217](#); see also *SWANCC, supra*, at 163-164, [121 S.Ct. 675](#). In addition, the Corps interpreted its own regulations to include “ephemeral streams” and “drainage ditches” as “tributaries” that are part of the “waters of the United States,” see [33 CFR § 328.3\(a\)\(5\)](#), provided that they have a perceptible “ordinary high water mark” as defined in [§ 328.3\(e\)](#). [65 Fed.Reg. 12823 \(2000\)](#). This interpretation extended “the waters of the United States” to virtually any land feature over which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark—even if only “the presence of litter and debris.” [33 CFR § 328.3\(e\)](#). See also U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulating Affairs, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of Engineers Needs to Evaluate Its District Office Practices in Determining Jurisdiction, GAO-04-297, pp. 20-22 (Feb.2004) (hereinafter GAO Report), <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04297.pdf> (all Internet materials as visited June 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). Prior to our decision in *SWANCC*, lower courts upheld the application of this expansive definition of “tributaries” to such entities as storm sewers that contained flow to covered waters during heavy rainfall, *United States v. Eidson*, 108 *726 F.3d 1336, 1340-1342 (C.A.11 1997), and dry arroyos connected to remote waters through the flow of groundwater over “centuries,” *Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA*, [765 F.2d 126, 129 \(C.A.10 1985\)](#).

In *SWANCC*, we considered the application of the Corps' “Migratory Bird Rule” to “an abandoned sand and gravel pit in northern Illinois.” [531 U.S., at 162, 121 S.Ct. 675](#). Observing that “[i]t was the *significant nexus* between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA in *Riverside Bayview*,” *id.*, at 167, [121 S.Ct. 675](#) (emphasis added), we held that *Riverside Bayview* did not establish “that the jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not adjacent to open water,” [531 U.S., at 168, 121 S.Ct. 675](#) (emphasis deleted). On the contrary, we held that “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters,” *id.*, at 171, [121 S.Ct. 675](#)—which, unlike the wetlands at issue in *Riverside Bayview*, did not “actually abut on a navigable waterway,” [531 U.S., at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675](#)—were not included as “waters of the United States.”

Following our decision in *SWANCC*, the Corps did not significantly revise its theory of federal jurisdiction under [§ 1344\(a\)](#). The Corps provided notice of a [proposed rulemaking in light of SWANCC, 68 Fed.Reg.1991 \(2003\)](#), but ultimately did not amend its published regulations. Because *SWANCC* did not directly address tributaries, the Corps notified its field staff that they “should continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters ... and, generally speaking, their tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands).” [68 Fed.Reg.1998](#). In addition, because *SWANCC* did not overrule *Riverside Bayview*, the Corps continues to assert jurisdiction over waters “‘neighboring’ ” traditional navigable waters and their tributaries. [68 Fed.Reg.1997](#) (quoting [33 CFR § 328.3\(c\)](#) (2002)).

Even after *SWANCC*, the lower courts have continued to uphold the Corps' sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains as “tributaries.” For example, courts have held that jurisdictional “tributaries” include *727 the “intermittent flow of surface water through approximately 2.4 miles of natural streams and manmade ditches (paralleling and crossing under I-64),” [**2218 Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., 344 F.3d 407, 410 \(C.A.4 2003\)](#); a “roadside ditch” whose water took “a winding, thirty-two-mile path to the *Chesapeake Bay*,” [United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 \(C.A.4 2003\)](#); irrigation ditches and drains that intermittently connect to covered waters, [Community Assn. for Restoration of Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943, 954-955 \(C.A.9 2002\)](#); [Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 534 \(C.A.9 2001\)](#); and (most implausibly of all) the “washes and arroyos” of an “arid development site,” located in the middle of the desert, through which “water courses ... during periods of heavy rain,” [Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flow-ers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118 \(C.A.9 2005\)](#).^{FN2}

FN2. We are indebted to the *Sonoran* court for a famous exchange, from the movie *Casablanca* (Warner Bros.1942), which portrays most vividly the absurdity of finding the desert filled with waters:

“ ‘Captain Renault [Claude Rains]: “What in heaven's name brought you to *Casablanca*?”